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CHAPTER IV

PROBLEM SITUATIONS INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF
INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL
SEA
For many years State A. had claimed a territorial sea of three miles
but recently by presidential proclamation had extended it to six
1niles.* State B, adjacent to and south of State A., has long claimed
a six-mile territorial sea. State B did not protest State A.'s territorial sea extension; however, other states have filed formal protests.
Ships bound to and from State B, including merchantmen, fishing
vessels and warships, customarily used a sea lane located between three
and five miles off the southern coast of State A. for a distance of about
100 miles. At the northern end of this 100-mile stretch, which was
approximately one-third of the length of State A.'s coastline, the sea
lane veered away from State A.'s coast and out into the high seas.
Until State A.'s recent presidential proclamation this sea lane was
entirely high seas opposite State A.'s coast, but now it "\vas well within
the newly-declared territorial sea.
A. recent change in the government of State B brought to power
several men who were unfriendly to the leaders of State A., and who,
it was widely rumored, had designs on part of State A.'s territory
nearest State B.
Officials of State A. had ob~served recently an increase in the number
of ships of State B ·w·hich were traversing and occasionally anchoring
in the territorial sea of State A., usually between the three and sixmile limits, but often inside of the three-mile limit.
State B was known to have nuclear weapons, a large high seas fishing fleet, and a good -sized navy.
State A. took a number of steps to augment her security against possible attack, particularly by State B, including the following:
( 1) State A. built a number of detection installations along her
entire coast, including the northern portion of her territory which
"\Vas sparsely populated.
( 2) State A. issued the following regulations to all states:
*See Diagram
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Diagram of problem situations right of innocent passage.

(a) All foreign submarines must navigate on the surface of
State A's territorial sea and show their flags;
(b) All foreign warships must give State A 24-hour prior noti·
fication of the intended passage through State A's territorial sea;
(c) All foreign warships must have their radar equipment secured* when passing through State A's territorial sea, except when
'veather conditions make navigation by visual devices hazardous;
(d) All fo~eign vessels are forbidden to use State A's territorial
sea if they have nuclear weapons aboard;

* "Secure," as used here, means "to lock up," "to put away," or "to make
unavailable for use."
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(e) All foreign vessels are forbidden to use State A's territorial
sea if they are transporting any \Var materiel bound to State B;
(f) All foreign fishing vessels are required to secure their fishing gear when passing through State A's territorial sea.
Several states officially acknowledged receipt of these regulations
but State B did not. I-Iovvever, a discussion of the regulations appeared in the press of State B, including adverse comments by "unofficial sources" who claimed that State A was guilty of aggressive action
taken against State B.
Subsequently the following events took place within State A's sixn1ile territorial sea. Which, if any, were violations of the right of innocent passage under the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958? What actions could
State A take to prevent or punish what it considered to be violations
of the right of innocent passage through her territorial sea?

EVENT I
A submarine, The Sailfish, was observed surfacing approximately
five miles off State A's shore about two miles north of the border
between the territorial seas of States A and B. It proceeded south
for a short distance without showing its flag, then stopped and
anchored. "When challenged by a naval vessel of State A, The Sailfish identified herself as belonging to State B and hoisted her flag.
When questioned by State A's vessel as to why she had anchored in
State A's territorial sea, The Sailfish weighed anchor and proceeded
into her own territorial sea without responding.
EVENT II
A warship, The El Toro, of State B, without giving prior identification to State A, departed from a port in State B and proceeded
into the territorial sea of State A approximately three miles off the
coast, heading in a northerly direction in the customary sea lane.
The El Toro's radar equipment was in operation. Instead of following the sea lane out into the high seas at a point about 100 miles from
State A's southern border, as she had done on previous occasions, the
El Toro proceeded up State A's coast within the territorial sea and
intensified the use of her radar equipment.
State A's detection stations observed the El Toro enter her territorial sea and knew that her radar equipment had not been secured
in accordance with State A's regulations. The detection stations and
visual observation posts kept the El Toro under constant surveillance
as it proceeded along the coast, expecting it to follow the sea lane out
into the high seas. When it did not do so, State A signalled the war-
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ship to depart from her territorial sea immediately for having failed
to give the required 24-hour notification and for failure to secure her
radar equipment while in State A's territorial sea. The El Toro finally left State A's territorial sea but continued to cruise northward
along the coast outside of the six-mile limit. When opposite the
northernmost portion of State A's territory in an area of the high seas
little used for navigation or fishing, the El Toro cruised back and forth
conducting a gunnery exercise, firing both nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons sea ward. During this exercise the El Toro was outside the
six-mile limit except during one of her maneuvers when she was a short
distance inside State A's territorial sea for a limited period of time.
EVENT Ill
A merchant ship, The Queen Bee, of State X, following the customary sea lane adjacent to the southern portion of State A, was proceeding in a southerly direction never closer than four miles to State
A's coast toward a port of State B with a cargo which included some
military equipment.
Officials of State A had good reason to suspect that The Queen
Bee was carrying the military cargo to State B.
State X had long claimed a three-mile territorial sea and was one
of the states which had filed a formal protest when State A extended
her territorial sea from three to six miles by presidential proclamation.
After travelling a short distance within the territorial sea as
claimed by State A, The Queen Bee was challenged by a warship of
State A and escorted outside the six-mile limit.
Later State X filed a formal protest with State A claiming (a)
that State A's extension of her territorial sea from three to six
miles had no validity under international law, and (b) that assuming, without admitting, the validity of State A's six-mile territorial
sea, State A had no right under the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to deny the right of innocent passage to a vessel carrying military cargo, no matter where it was
bound.
EVENT IV
A fishing vessel, The Pelican, of State B, returning from a successful fishing trip in the high seas, was observed by officials of
State A late one afternoon about two miles off State A's coast, approximately one mile to · the land ward of the customary sea lane,
proceeding at about four knots toward her horne port.
The Pelican was some twenty miles north of the border between
States A and B, in an area of State A's territorial sea known to be
good fishing waters.
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Although the fishing nets of The Pelican were not secured in accordance with State A's regulations they were not in the water. Officials
of State A, not knowing that The Pelican's holds were already full
of fish, were suspicious that she might be planning to fish after dark
en route to her home port.
State A's officials, after observing members of the crew of The
Pelican taking hand-line soundings and sea bed samples as the vessel
cruised southward, ordered a warship to visit and search her in order
to determine (a) why The Pelican was proceeding so slowly through
State A's territorial sea, (b) why she was approximately one mile
landward of the custo1nary sea lane, and (c) why her crew members
were taking soundings and sea bed samples.
During the visit and search which took only thirty minutes, officers
of the warship accidentally discovered among the crew a Mr. 1{., a
citizen of State A wanted in State A for several :felonies. :1\fr. K.
was arrested and taken aboard the warship, after which The Pelican
was escorted outside the six-mile limit for having violated the right
of innocent passage.
ANALYSIS
A. EVENT I (Submarine surfacing within the territorial sea, anchoring, and failing to fly flag.)

It seems clear that when State B's submarine, The Sailfish, surfaced within State A's six-mile territorial sea it violated Article 14(6)
of the Geneva Convention which provides that "submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." Since
The Sailfish surfaced about five miles off State A's coast, it must have
travelled submerged for at least a mile in the territorial sea.
While other states which claim a narrower territorial sea than six
miles, say, three or four miles, would not be bound by State A's extension of her territorial sea of the additional three~ miles unless there
was an implied accession to the extension after ample time for protesting, it would be untenable for State B to object because she herself claims six miles. 1 Therefore, as to State B the extension by
State A of her territorial sea from three miles to six miles is binding
both because State B claims six miles and because of the implied
assent in State B's failure to file a protest. State B's submarine is
required to navigate on the surface within State A's six-mile
territorial sea.
1

Rights claimed unilaterally by states vis-a-vis each other are reciprocal in
the sense that one state generally may not deny to another state a right which
it is claiming for itself unless (a) the right is exclusive to the first' state (e.g.,
the exclusive right to fish in a state's own territorial sea, or exploit the natural
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The failure of The Sailfish to show her flag until challenged to do
so was also a violation of the Convention. Although the draft articles
of the International Law Commission provided only that "submarines
are required to navigate on the surface," without requiring a showing
of the flag, the Conference wisely included this latter provision as
added protection to the coastal state.
\Vhether The Sailfish violated the Convention in stopping and anchoring is debatable. Such action is permitted under Article 14 ( 3)
"but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or
are rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress." 2 The Sailfish might be able to show that her stopping and anchoring were in
confor1nity with the provisions of the Convention. However, refusal
of The Sailfish to respond to State A's question as to why she had
stopped and anchored suggests the absence of any distress, force majeure, or that the submarine's action was in fact incidental to ordinary
navigation.
resources of its continental shelf) ; or (b) the right is predicated upon unusual
circumstances which are generally recognized in the world community as giving
rise to the special right (e.g., a state such as Norway with a deeply indented
coastline may claim the right to use straight baselines from which to measure
the breadth of the territorial sea and deny to a state with a smooth coastline
the right to use the same basis of measurement). (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Oase, I.O.J. Reports, 116 (1951) ; Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, Art. 4) ; or (c) the right is an "historic" one which has been long recognized
(e.g., historic bays, etc.).
But, aside from these major exceptions, one state must accord to other states
in the international community the same rights which it is claiming for itself.
Hence, a state claiming a six-mile territorial sea under the facts given here
would be in an untenable position in denying the validity of an equivalent claim
by another state.
It should be emphasized, of course, that although one state may be bound by
a fortiori reasoning from denying to another what is being claimed for itself, this
fact alone does not bind other states which claim something less. For example,
the fact that Chile, Ecuador and Peru have claimed sovereignty over a 200-mile
breadth of high seas would preclude their objecting if some other state made a
similar claim. However, this fact does not establish the 200-mile claim as the
new customary international law of the territorial sea. Similarly, the fact that
State B in the problem situation claims a six-mile territorial sea and hence must
accord that same right to ·state A under the facts given, does not mean that the
six-mile limit thereby becomes international law. While it is true that widespread state practice develops a customary international law by the process
of reciprocal interaction and accommodation of competing claims, the practice ·
must be sufficiently inclusive of the major claimants to justify a finding of
the emergence of a new customary international law. In the case of a question
involving the law of the sea such as the breadth of the territorial sea, a sixmile limit could not be claimed as the new international law, absent an .accession,
express or implied, by a majority of the major maritime states.
2
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 52 (1958).
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Hence, unless State B provides a sat isfa ct,' ry answer to State A's
question regarding the reason for the stopping and anchoring by T he
Sailfish, it may be concluded that this action, like the other t wo, was
in violation of the Convention.
B. EVENT II (Pa ssage of State B's warship without 24-hour notifi ..
cation.)

The first and foremost question is ·whether warships have the r ight
of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Clearly the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone guar antees the right
of "innocent passage" to such ships as ·well as to other types of vessels.
Section I I of the Convention is headed "Right of Innocent P assage"
and Sub-Section A is entitled "Rules applicable to All Ships." 3
Moreover, in Article 14 'vhich follows immediately after S ub-Section
A, paragraph six relates to a specific type o:f warship, namely, submarines, expressly providing that "submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." 4 This provision indicates
exactly what this particular type of warship must do in two respects in
order not to violate the right of innocent passage.
That the Internationa.l La'v Commission intended the right of innocent passage to apply to warships, subject to the express right of
the coastal state under Sub-Section D to impose regulations on warships is indicated by the commentary to its final articles which, under
the heading, "Right of Innocent Passage," says that "the general
rules laid down in sub-section A . . . apply to the ships referred to
in sub-sections C and D, subject to the reservations stated there." 5
It is true that the above commentary is somewhat in conflict with
Article 24 of the International Law Commission's final draft articles
which would have required prior notification and authorization for
warships to pass through territorial seas, indicating that it would
not be a right of the flag state but a privilege which could be granted
or withheld. Indeed, the last sentence of this Article 24 begins, "Normally it (the coastal state) shall grant innocent passage . . . . " 6
However, it will be remembered that this proposal of the International Law Commission was omitted from the Convention, clearly indicating that innocent passage through the territ~rial sea was
considered by the Conference to be a right of warships, as well as for
all other vessels, and not merely a privilege which the coastal state
might grant or withhold.
Dr. El-Erian of Egypt staunchly maintains that the record of the
Geneva Conference indicates that warships do not have the right
3

U.N. Doc.. A/CONF. 13/L. 52 (1958).
(Ibid., at Art.14(6).
5
U.N. Doc. A/3159, 18 (1956).
6
Ibid., at 22
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o£ innocent passage. 7 Professor Sorensen o£ Denmark also believes
that the majority o£ delegates did not intend warships to have this
right, although he admits £rankly that "the actual text o£ the Convention would therefore warrant the conclusion that warships have
the same rights in this respect as other ships. . . ." 8 A careful analysis o£ the record o£ the Geneva Conference supports the conclusion
that the majority of states favored the right o£ innocent passage £or
warships and drafted the provisions o£ the Convention accordingly.
With all due deference to advocates o£ a contrary vie'Y, on this matter
they are in error.
Finally, perhaps as strong evidence as any that the Convention does
guarantee the right o£ innocent passage £or warships is the £act that
members o£ the Soviet bloc who were most opposed to granting this
right to warships, 9 almost uniformly filed reservations to Article 23
o£ the Convention at the time o£ signature, the net import o£ which
is to reduce the right o£ innocent passage to a mere privilege in their
own territorial seas. Typical is the reservation o£ the U.S.S.R.. which
provides,
"The Government o£ the Union o£ Soviet Socialist Republics considers that a coastal State has the right to establish procedures £or the authorization o£ the passage o£ foreign
warships through its territorial waters." 10
Similar reservations to Article 23 were also filed by Bulgaria,
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Ukraine.11
Colombia filed a declaration regarding Article 23 along the same
lines, using a curious and inapplicable analogy to the passage o£
foreign troops through Colombian territory, saying,
". . . [U] nder Article 98 o£ the Colombian Constitution,
authorization by the Senate is required £or the passage o£
foreign troops through Colombian territory and that, by
analogy, such authorization is accordingly also required £or
the passage o£ foreign warships through Colombian territorial waters." 12
It is obvious that i£ the states indicated above had not £elt that the
Convention guarantees the right o£ innocent passage to warships, they
7

U.N. General Assembly Official Records 13th Sess., 6th Comm. AI C. 6/SR. 590,
14 (1958) (provisional record).
8
Sorensen, "The Law of the Sea," International Conciliation, No. 520, 244
(1958).
9
See arguments of Yugoslav and U.S.S.R. delegates in 3 Official Records
(A/CONF. 13/39, 129 (1958)).
10
Information supplied by the U.N. Secretariat.
11

12

Ibid.
Ibid.
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'vould not have made a reservation to the Convention to deny the
right by making passage subject to prior authorization by the coastal
state.
EVENT ll (Passage of warship without giving prior notification)
The next question is whether the warship, the El Toro of State B,
violated the Convention by not giving prior notification to State A of
its intention to enter State A's territorial sea.
The final articles of the International Law Commission contained
a provision which made the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject not only to prior notification but also previous authorization. However, the Convention contains no such provision.
Therefore, it would appear that State B had no duty to State A to
give prior notification.
On the other hand, Article 23 of the Convention gives the coastal
state the right to impose regulations concerning the passage of warships as follows:

"If any warship does not comply with the regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made
to it, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the
territorial sea." 13
Except for a slight change in wording, this article is the same as
Article 25 of the final draft of the International Law Commission. 14
The question then arises as to whether a coastal state may include
among its regulations one requiring prior notification since the Convention eliminated that specific provision from its articles, along with
the one permitting the coastal state to require previous authorization.
It could be argued that since this specific provision as to prior
notification was placed in a separate article by the International Law
Commission, the more general article permitting the coastal state
to impose regulations was not intended to go so far as to permit a
regulation requiring prior notification (and authorization). If the
general article permitting regulations had contemplated such safeguards to the coastal state as prior notification and authorization, it
would have been superfluous to have stated them . in a separate
article.
13

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, Art. 23 (1958).
U.N. Doc. A/3159, 23 (1956). The commentary by the I.L.C. following this
Article (25) is not at all helpful in indicating why the Article was drafted as
it was, nor in explaining the kinds of regulations contemplated. The commentary merely says: "The article indicates the course to be followed by the
coastal State in the event of failure to observe the regulations of the coastal
State."
14
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On the other hand, it see1ns more logical to argue that the right
of a coastal state to impose regulations concerning passage of \varships through its territorial sea includes the right to impose \vhatever
regulation is reasonable, considering all of the circumstances in context. The question, therefore, is whether the requirement promulgated
by State A requiring a 24-hour notice prior to passage of \varshi ps
through its territorial sea is reasonable, even though the Conference
did not include it in the Convention as a specific right of the coastal
state.
At this point it seems desirable to distinguish clearly bet-vveen the
right of a coastal state to demand notice from another state of the
intended passage of a warship through the territorial sea and the right
of a coastal state to grant or withhold authorization. The matter of
giving notice imposes a slight duty upon the warship state, but the
right to the innocent passage is guaranteed if the prior notice is given.
The only act involved is that of the warship state in giving notice.
On the other hand, th.c requirement of prior atttthorization places a
serious burden and limitation on the ·warship's right of innocent passage, reducing it to a mere privilege which the coastal state may negate
by denying authorization. The right to the innocent passage is made
subject to a judgment and an act by the coastal state-i.e., the decision
whether to grant or withhold authorization and the granting of the
authorization, plus the corollary right to refuse authorization or to
'vithdraw it after it has been given. Hence, the matter of prior
authorization contemplates an act by both states; the act by the warship state in requesting permission, and the act by the coastal state
in granting (or withholding) the permission.
It was because this requirement of prior authorization would have
eliminated the right of innocent passage for warships that it was
rejected in the plenary meetings of the Conference. 15
Since the general requirement of prior notice does not affect the
right of innocent passage, inflicting no more than a slight in convenience on the state which has to file notice, and since the specific
115

The United States introduced a proposal in the First Committee to delete
the article (Art. 2.4 ) requiring prior notice and authorization on the ground
(a) that it contradicted Art. 15 which provided that ships of all States shall
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and (b) that it
was unnecessary in view of the definition of "innocent passage" which gave the
coastal State all the protection it needed. The United States proposal was
withdrawn before being voted upon (3 Official Records 127) because other similar proposals such as that of the Netherlands (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 51) were
before the Committee. Although the requirement of prior notification and
authorization was approved by the First Committee (3 Official Records (Annexes) 258, 260), this requirement was eliminated in the plenary meetings and
omitted from the Convention.
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requirement of 24-hour notice invoked by State A appears to be
reasonable, especially in the case of State B of whom she has certain
justifiable fears of possible aggression, it follows that State A had
a right under Article 23 of the Convention to issue the regulation.
Inasmuch as the warship of State B did not give the requisite
notice, the question then arises as to what action n1ay be taken by
State A. The language of Article 23 is not entirely clear on this
question in the following respect. The article says that "the coastal
State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea." However,
this sanction is conditioned by a dual provision: "if the \Varship does
not comply with regulations ... and disregards any request for con1pliance. . . . " Since this language is conjunctive rather than disjunctive, it could be argued that State A is entitled to ask the warship
to leave the territorial sea only ( 1) after failure to co1nply 'vith the
regulation, 'vhich failure has occurred, and (2) after disregarding a
request for compliance. The facts indicate that State A made a request for the departure of the El Toro, but did not make a request
for the compliance with the 24-hour notice prior to this request for
the departure. Thus, if one interprets the language strictly it could
be contended that State A could not request the departure from the
territorial sea following the failure of the El Toro to comply "Tith the
24-hour notice until State B had also received and disregarded State
A's requested compliance.
However, a more logical conclusion would seem to be that State A
could request the departure from the territorial sea of the El Toro
for the non-compliance with the 24-hour notice without also having
to make a subsequent request for compliance because once the El Toro
entered the territorial sea of State A it became impossible, at least
for this trip, for State A to get or for State B to give the 24-hour
prior notice. Hence, it would be illogical to require State A to request
compliance by State B once the territorial sea of State A had been
entered as a condition precedent to State A's right to require the 'varship to leave the territorial sea.
The language of Article 23 was probably written in its present form
in order that a warship which had inadvertently or unknowingly
violated some regulation of the coastal state concerning innocent
passage through the territorial sea would not be required to leave until
and unless she disregarded a request for compliance. However, the
kind of compliance contemplated by the framers of Article 23 'vas
surely that which would still be possible after the warship 'vas in the
territorial sea, such as securing of radar equipment, and not some act
such as the giving of 24-hour notice 'vhich after entrance of the territorial sea was no longer possible.
'
607631--61----10
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EVENT ll (Passage of warship without securing radar equipment)

The failure of the El Toro to secure her radar equipment was a clear
violation of State A's regulation unless the vveather conditions were
such as to make navigation by visual devices hazardous. Since the
facts indicate that State A's visual observations were able to keep
the El Toro under constant surveillance, it see1ns logical to assume
that weather conditions ·were sufficiently good to enable the El Toro
to see the shoreline and thereby navigate free from danger without
using the radar equipment. Moreover, the fact that the El Toro
navigated the full length of the coastline of State A and subsequently
conducted a gunnery exercise is further evidence that the use of the
radar was unnecessary for safe navigation.
The next question-one which must always be asked with respect
to all regulations in1posed by the coastal state upon warships (and
other ships) exercising the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea-is whether the regulation relating to the securing of all
radar equipment was reasonable. The requirement of reasonableness
is not only implied in order to balance the equities between the need
for a coastal state to maintain its security, and the need of the overseas state to navigate through territorial seas without undue impediments, but is clearly expressed as a duty of the coastal state in Article
15 which provides that: "The coastal State must not hamper innocent
passage through the territorial sea."
Nothing in the facts indicates that State A's requirement that all
·warships secure their radar equipment ·,vhen passing through the
territorial sea, except when weather conditions would make navigation
by visual devices hazardous, in any way contravenes the provision of
Article 15 that the coastal state must not hamper innocent passage.
Hence, State B would be required to abide by the regulation, absent
so1ne evidence that it was either unreasonable or in son1e way hampered innocent passage.
From the standpoint of State A, since it is possible for State B's
shipboard radar equipment to be used for mapping State A's coast,
and in view of the known animosity of State B and the possibility
of invasion by State B in pursuance of its claim to some of State
A's territory, State A's regulation that all radar equipment be secured
appears to be a reasonable security measure.
One final question remains: whether under Article 23 State A could
order the warship out of territorial waters for violating the regulation regarding the securing of radar equipment without first making
a request for compliance and having it disregarded. As previously
indicated, in the discussion of the 24-hour prior notification provision, the most plausible reason for requesting compliance, following
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a violation, before invoking the sanction of requiring the warship
to leave the territorial sea is to prevent the hampering of innocent
passage in the case of a ship which inadvertently or unknowingly
violates a regulation and which would thereupon be asked to depart
from the territorial sea without first being given a chance to comply.
In the present case, although State B had not officially acknow1edged receipt of State A's regulations, it may be assumed that they
'vere received and known to the officials of State B because of the
discussion in the press. Hence, the violation could hardly have
occurred "unknowingly."
Could the violation have occurred "inadvertently~" This also
does not seem likely in view of the manner in which the radar equipInent was being used.
Thus it would follow that in a case like the present one the violation of the regulation, without the further requirement of the request
for compliance, would be all that State A would have to show in
order to justify the demand that El Toro depart from State A's
territorial sea. Of course, since the El Toro did depart, although
it re-entered later during the maneuvers, State A could not impose
any further sanction under the Convention since the right of the
coastal State to require the warship to leave the territorial sea is the
only sanction provided.
EVENT II (Passage of a warship through the territorial sea carry·
ing nuclear weapons)

The next question is whether State A has the right to forbid the passage through her territorial sea of all foreign vessels which have nuclear weapons aboard.
One 'vay to approach this question is to inquire whether the Conference included such a right in the Convention, either specifically or
under a general provision permitting the coastal state to insure that
the passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea is "innocent."
If the Convention does not contain a provision granting to the coastal
state the specific right, did the Conference exclude this right which
the coastal state is now trying to invoke~
A proposal by Yugoslavia was introduced in the First Committee
of the Conference, but defeated by an overwhelming vote, which directly relates to this question. Yugoslavia proposed that,
"The coastal State may deny the exercise of the right of
i~nocent passage through its territorial sea to any ship carrying any kind of nuclear 'veapon." 16
16

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.l/L. 21 (1958).
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The delegate from Yugoslavia said that the proposed new paragraph was self-explanatory and reflected his government's belief that
nuclear energy should be applied solely to peaceful ends and that international law did not authorize its utilization for military
purposes. 17
Before being voted upon the proposal 'vas changed at the suggestion
of the Yugoslav delegate so that the word "ship" read "warship."
Despite this change which would have limited the right of prohibition
by coastal states to warships carrying nuclear 'veapons through the
territorial sea, rather than all ships, the proposal was decisively rejected by 03 votes against, 7 in favor, with 22 abstentions. 18
By refusing to adopt th]s proposal, the First Committee clearly indicated that the mere carrying of any kind of nuclear weapon on
board a warship within the territorial sea of another state could not
be prohibited. Therefore, it could be argued that the coastal state
could not promulgate such a prohibition under the general provisions
of the Convention which give the coastal state the right to do 'vhat is
necessary to insure the innocence of passage of vessels through the territorial sea because to do so in light of the Conference action on the
Yugoslav proposal would be to permit the inclusion of a specific right
to a coastal state (under a general provision of the Convention) 'vhich
the Conference emphatically excluded.
Although this argument is persuasive, it is by no means conclusive.
That which is omitted from this or any other convention is significant,
but parties to a convention are only bound by what is included therein,
not by 'vhat was excluded. Moreover, it is well recognized that the
various committees of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, as well as
the plenary meetings, often eschewed the inclusion in the conventions
of a specific right or duty because it felt that the matter could be
treated more judiciously by incorporating a general right or duty.
Such is the case with the articles in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone which give the coastal state the right to
"take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
is not innocent," 19 without specifying exactly 'vhat those necessary
steps may include (or not include). Also the general rule of the Convention applicable to warships gives the coastal state the right to
pass "regulations" with which the warship must comply / 0 without
indicating either the extent of those "regulations" or the limitations
thereof.
17
18
19
20

3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 129 (1958)).
3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 131 (1958)).
Art. 16 (1).
Art. 23.
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It may be concluded therefore that although the Conference rejected a specific proposal which vvould have given the coastal state
the blanket right to prohibit all warships from carrying nuclear
'veapons through its territorial sea, under certain circum~tances involving danger to security the coastal state may include such a prohibition as a part of the general rights which the Convention accords
to the coastal st ate to regulate the passage of warships through the
terri to rial sea.
It will be remembered from the previous discussion of another defeated proposal, the one which would have given the coastal state the
right to require prior notification and authorization before foreign
' varships could pass through the territorial sea, it was concluded that
the coastal state could require prior notificat ion because such notification would not constitute such a burden upon innocent passage a.s
t o hamper it, which the coastal state is obligated not to do under
A rticle 15 (1). On the other hand, it was concluded that to permit
the coastal state to require prior authorization of foreign vessels
desiring to traverse the territorial sea would in :fact place too great
a burden on the basic right of innocent passage.
The fundamental and pervasive test in determining the kind and
extent of regulations which a coastal state may impose upon vessels
passing through its territorial sea is that "simple and ubiquitous, but
indispensable, standard of what, considering all relevant policies and
all variables in context, is reasonable as between the parties." 21 The
parties in the present situation are (1) the coastal state with its
justifiable demand for security, as well as peace and good order, and
(2) the overseas state with its equally justifiable demand for the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea because, without this
r ight "freedom of the high seas for navigation" becomes an empty
phrase. Since one o£ the primary purposes of navigation is to reach
a destination requiring passage through some state's territorial sea,
t he right of innocent passage is vitaL
Leaving aside for the moment the action of the Conference in r ejecting the Yugoslav proposal which would have given the coastal
st ate the kind of right which State A is now trying to invoke against
the warship of State B, the question is whether the attempt of State
A t o prohibit the use of its territor ial sea to all vessels, or at least
all war ships, carrying nuclear weapons is reasonable. To ans·wer
this quest]on it is necessary to emphasize again the right-duty relationship of the coastal state with all overseas states. The coastal
21

McDougal and Sch lei, "The H yd r ogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
1\lleasures for Secu rity," 64 Yale Law Journal 648, 660 (1955) ; Jessup, The
Law of T erritorial Water s and };f aritime Jurisdiction 9'5 (1927) ; S1nith, The
Law an d Oust01n of the Sea 20 (2n d ed. 1950) .
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state has the right, a1nong others, to take necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent and to promulgate rules :for :foreign warships. Among its various duties the coastal
state is charged by Article 15 o£ the Convention with not hampering
innocent passage of any ship, merchant vessel or warship, through
the territorial sea.
It should also be emphasized that the Convention relates the question
o£ innocence o£ passage to the nature o£ passage itself without regard
to any acts actually committed in the territorial sea. This being the
case the basic question is: How could the mere carrying o£ nuclear
weapons on a warship passing through the territorial sea prejudice
the "peace, good order or security" o£ a coastal state, absent rather
weighty evidence that some overt act against the coastal state was
contemplated or that the mere carrying was ultrahazardous~
It is difficult to see how State A could establish that carrying
nuclear weapons through the territorial sea would endanger her
security. I£ a warship is traversing the territorial sea en route to
the high seas to conduct gunnery exercises, which is what State B
ultimately did, the mere passage through the territorial sea hardly
endangers the security o£ the coastal state. 0£ course, because o£ the
known animosity o£ State B toward State A it might be suspected
that State B contemplated hostile actions against State A either
now or at some later date. However, this suspicion alone would
hardly justify a denial o£ the right o£ innocent passage to B's warships just because they were carrying nuclear weapons.
Several difficult subsidiary questions come quickly to mind:
(1) I£ the coastal state may :forbid warships carrying nuclear
weapons to use its territorial sea, may this prohibition be invoked
at the whim o:f the coastal state, or only after some objectively-verifiable showing o£ need :for the prohibition in order to avoid jeopardizing the "peace, good order or security o£ the coastal State~" Since
the Conference voted against giving the coastal state the right o£ a
blanket prohibition, it seems clear that the coastal state could :forbid
warships carrying nuclear weapons to use its territorial sea only i£ it
were determined to be reasonably necessary :for its own protection.
The important :fact to remember is that the passage must be innocent.
Under the Convention passage is deemed to be innocent "so long as it
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security o£ the coastal
State. 22
(2) Assuming that the mere carrying o£ nuclear weapons by a warship automatically destroyed its innocence o£ passage through the
territorial sea, thus justifying the coastal state in prohibiting such
22

Art. 14 ( 4) .
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passage, what steps may be taken to see that the prohibition is effective? May the coastal state require a certification from the warship
prior to passage, reserving the right to grant or withhold authorization of the passage? May the coastal state search the warship in case
it doubts the validity of the certification, or merely order the \varship
out of the territorial sea on the basis of unconfirmed doubts?
These and other questions suggest that an attempt to administer
a prohibition against warships merely carrying nuclear weapons while
passing through the territorial sea of another state might seriously
hamper innocent passage. In the final analysis the coastal state
would have no way of knowing in most cases whether nuclear weapons were being carried by a warship without some sort of inspection.
Such inspection on the high seas is not possible under Article 9 of the
Convention on the High Seas which accords warships "complete immunity :from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." 23
While the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
does not contain a similar provision, it is unlikely that any State
would permit a boarding and inspection of its warships by a coastal
State while passing through the territorial sea. It is obvious that
the determination by the coastal state of the presence of nuclear
we a pons on board a 'varshi p is much more difficult than the determination of whether a ship's radar is in use, or secured, during passage through the territorial sea. In the latter case, if the radar equipment is being used, shore detection devices can determine this fact.
Hence, the Conference reached a logical and correct conclusion
in denying the coasta.l state the absolute right to forbid the passage
through the territorial sea of warships carrying nuclear we a pons.
Moreover, because of the range and destructive power of such weapons,
little if anything is added to a coastal state's security by insisting that
a warship with nuclear weapons remain 3.1 miles off the coast with
a three-mile territorial sea, or 6.1 miles off the coast of a state which
claims a six-mile limit.
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, it should be acknowledged
that under unusual circumstances the coastal state might justifiably
prohibit the passage of warships carrying nuclear weapons through
its territorial sea. The Convention gives the coastal state the right
to "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage
which is not innocent," 24 and the further right ''to suspend temporarily
in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security." 25
23

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 53 and co1T.. l (1958).
Art. 16 ( 1) .
25
Art. 16 ( 3) .
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vVhile this latter right of suspension is not permitted in the territorial
sea of straits which are used for international navigation, 26 it would
apply in our present hypothetical situation which does not involve a
strait.
Assuming that all of the conditions of the right of temporary
suspension of innocent passage are present, especially a showing that
such suspension is essential for the protection of the coastal state's
security, the right of suspension would include lesser rights such as
exclusion of warships for the carrying of nuclear weapons. It is
clear, however, that the coastal state would have to produce strong
evidence which vvould reasonably support the security need of temporary suspension, or exclusion for carrying nuclear weapons, in order
for such drastic action to be lawful under the Convention or, apart
from the Convention, under the recognized principle of the inherent
right of self -defense.
0 onclusion: Since the facts of the present case do not indicate
any serious danger to the security of State A by the passage of vessels
(including warships) of foreign states through State A's territorial
sea with nuclear weapons aboard, the blanket regulations of State
A. in this regard are invalid. Therefore, State B was within her
rights in having nuclear weapons aboard her warship and the innocence of her passage through State A's territorial sea was not destroyed by the n1ere presence of such vveapons.
EVENT II (Gunnery exercise of warship partly within territorial
sea of State A)

The next question is vvhether State B's warship violated certain
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone by conducting a gunnery exercise, firing both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons seaward, in an area of the high seas (except for
one maneuver into the territorial sea) adjacent to a remote and
sparsely inhabited portion of State A's territory.
In order to focus attention on the relationship between State A
and B, we n1ay exclude from consideration the rights and duties of
State B to other states which might be navigating through, fishing in,
or otherwise using the area of the high seas affected by the gunnery
exercise. As a general principle State B vvould have the right to
use this area of the high seas for gunnery exercises, subject only to
the duty to accommodate her use to the inclusive uses of other states
26

Art. 16 ( 4).
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in order that no user would be unreasonably endanger ed or impeded. 27
Also, we may put aside consideration of any possible duties which
State A might have had to all other states for the acts of State B in
Stat~ A's territorial sea if the Convention had adopted the article proposed by the International La "\V Commission requiring, among other
things, that the coastal state not allo"\v the territorial sea t o be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states. 28
It seems clear that any use by State B of State A 's territorial sea
for a gunnery exercise, whether intentional or unintentional, was a
violation of the Convention's definition of passage, even though the
exercise Inay have been quite innocent in not prejudicing the "peace,
good order or security" of State A .
The maneuver of the battleship within State A's six-Inile limit, even
though of short duration, does not constitute "passage" under the Convention which provides,
"Passage means navigation through the ter ritorial sea for
the purrpose either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or of
making for the high seas from internal waters." 29 (italics
added)
27

A claim of right to use an area of the high seas for military exercises
(i.e. gunnery exercises, nuclear weapons testing, ballistic missile firing, etc.)
constitutes the equivalent of an exclusive use for a limited period of time of
an area of the high sea because the danger to navigation, fishing, scientific
research, and other uses of the area during the military exercises is such that
all states other lthan the State conducting the exercises will, as a rule, stay
clear of the area.
The claim of right to use the designated area for the military exercises is
justified on the ground that this is as valid a use of the high seas as the
historic ones of navigation and fishing contemplated by Grotius over three
centuries ago.
But, it should be recognized that as the weapons increase in magnitude the
area of the high seas required for the testing also increases enormously. Hence,
serious impairment of other uses such as navigation, fishing, scientific research,
etc., may occur unless (a) the period of the tests is reduced to a few weeks, or
even to a few days, (b) the area is kept to the absolute minimun1 consistent
with the safety of other concurrent users of the general area, (c) the area
is selected in relatively isola ted parts of the high seas little used f or navigation, fishing, etc., and (d) the military exercises, especially nuclear weapons
testing, does not result in substantial and continued deprivation of other uses
because of lingering after effects upon 1the conclusion of the exercises.
It follows, therefore, that although it appears that the other inclusive user s
are having to do the accommodating to the state conducting the military
exercises, the latter is burdened with a number of responsibilities to all other
users as indicated above, plus the obvious duty to a ccom1noda te th e oth er users
by giving them adequate advance notice of t he planned military exercises.
28
Article 16 ( 1) of I.L.C. final draft articles ( A/3159, 6 (1956) ) .
29
Art. 14(2).
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Navigation o£ the El Toro in connection 1vith a gunnery exercise
as in the present case 1vas not for the purpose of traversing the territorial sea. The warship was not traversing State A's territorial sea
t o get through it or to proceed to or £rom int~rnal waters; instead,
she was using the territorial sea £or another purpose-a gunnery exercise. True, during the gunnery exercise the El Toro entered the
territoral sea at one point and left it at another and hence navigated
through it. But, the navigation was not £or the purpose contemplated
by the Convention in summarizing the purpose which qriginally gave
rise to the right o£ innocent passage, namely, to achieve freedom o£
navigation through the territorial seas in order to permit ships to
reach their destinations with the least possible burden on their passage
consistent with need o£ the coastal state to protect itsel£. 30
Even more important than the £act that the use by State B o£ State
A's territorial sea was a violation o£ "passage" as defined under the
Convention on the 'Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, is the £act
that it was a clear violation o£ State A's sovereignty. This sovereignty, derived £rom more than two centuries o£ state practice and
universally recognized, not\vithstanding disagreement as to the
precise breadth o£ the territorial sea, provides the coastal state with
the exclusive use o£ the territorial sea, the subsoil and the airspace
above the waters, subject only to the right o£ other states to "innocent
passage." No other state, without ·express permission o£ the coastal
state, may exploit any use or take any action within the territorial
sea, whether harmful to the coastal state or not. Thus, an overseas
state may not fish within the territorial sea, carry on perfectly innocent scientific research, or do anything therein except to navigate
innocently £or the specific purpose o£ traversing the sea.
Hence, the action o£ State B in conducting part o£ its gunnery
exercise within the territorial sea o£ State A, however inadvertent
it may have been and quite aside £rom whether it did the slightest
damage to the territorial sea or the sparsely populated coast of State
A, was a violation o£ State A's sovereignty. Therefore, State A would
be entitled to protest the breach o£ sovereignty and demand that it
not be repeated. The £acts do not indicate any damage to State A,

° Colombos, International Law of the Sea 98 (3rd rev. ed. 1954) and citations
therein. Jessup contends that the right of innocent passage historically bad
nothing to do with the passage of ships bound to or from a port of the State and
that the right of access to ports should be distinguished from the right of innocent passage. Jessup, ''The International Law Commission's 1954 Report on
the Regime of the Territorial Sea," 49 A.J.I.L. 221, 226 (1955). Whatever the
historical origin of the right of innocent passage, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone now includes the right of access to internal
watel's under the right of innocent passage.
3
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but if any did occur in connection with the breach of sovereignty,
State B would be liable.
C. EVENT III (Merchant ship carrying military cargo through extended territorial sea which extension the flag State has not
recognized.)

The first question relates to the effect of an attempt by a coastal
state to extend its territorial sea through unilateral action and the
duty, if any, of an overseas state to recognize such an extension when
the overseas state claims a narrower territorial sea and has filed
a formal protest against the extension.
In oft-quoted language of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Oase, the
International Court of Justice said,
"The delimitation of sea areas has always an international
aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the
coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it
is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral
act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake
it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other
States depends upon internationallaw." 31
It follows from the above language which succinctly summarizes
the international law on the point, that whereas State A may by
unilateral act claim an extension of her territorial sea from three to
six miles, the claim is not binding upon other States. State X, which
claims a three-mile limit, is not required to recognize the extension.
Of course, if State X had failed to protest against State A's claim
of an additional three miles of territorial sea, it might be argued
after the lapse of a reasonable length of time that State X had tacitly
agreed to the extension. However, in the present case State X filed
a formal protest with State A.
Also, it should be noted that if State X claimed a six-mile territorial sea, it follows that she could not object to the extension by
State A from three to six miles. A state generally may not deny to
other states rights which it claims for itself.32 Here, however, the
fact that State X has long claimed only a three-mile territorial sea
justifies her protest to State A.
·
Thus it may be concluded that as far as State X was concerned
her merchant ship, The Queen Bee, was travelling in high seas rather
than in the territorial sea of State A. This being the case, State A
had no jurisdiction over The Queen Bee and was committing an
unlawful act in escorting the merchant ship outside the six-mile limit.
31
32

I.C.J. Reports, 132 (1951).
See footnote 1.
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Therefore part (a) of State X's protest was justified. However,
that part of the protest which asserted that State A's extension has
no validity under internationalla w, is too broad. State A's extension
of her territorial sea from three to six miles would be valid under
international law as to states now claiming a territorial sea of six
n1iles, and as to states claiming less than six miles but which failed
to protest after the lapse of a reasonable time.
Part (b) of State X's protest assumes, without admitting, the
validity of State A's extension of the territorial sea to. six miles and
then challenges the right of State A under the Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958) to deny the right
of innocent passage to a vessel carrying military cargo through said
territorial sea.
The question here is whether passage through the territorial sea
loses its innocence by the m,ere transportation of military cargo 'vhen
no act has been committed by the ship which is prejudicial to the
"peace, good order or security" of the coastal state.
The language of the Convention defining innocent passage is somewhat different from the language proposed by the International La "\V
Commission. The Convention defines innocent passage in the follovving terms,
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and
with other rules of internationalla w ." 33
On the other hand, the International Law Commission phrased its
article in terms which placed emphasis upon the commission of acts,
not the mere passage itself, concluding,
"Passage is innocent so long as a ship does not use the
territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the security of the coastal State or contrary to the present rules, or
to other rules of international law." 34
It is clear that the Passage of The Queen Bee through State A 's
territorial sea was innocent under the definition of the International
Law Commission because she did not commit any act during the
passage which in any way could be considered prejudicial to State
A's security.
The question remains as to whether the passage of The Queen
Bee was prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal
33
34

Art. 14 ( 4) .
U.N. Doc. A/3159, 19 (1956).
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state. What constitutes prejudicial passage is not defined in the
Convention, nor is there any indication as to whether there must
be a direct causation between the passage and the prejudice to the
"peace, good order, or security" of the coastal state. If States A and
B were at war, then it would be logical to assume that the passage
of a ship through State A's territorial sea with military cargo bound
for State B would be prejudicial to State A's "peace, good order or
security" (quite likely to all three).
Here, however, despite certain frictions between the two states,
there is no indication that the military cargo on The Queen Bee bound
for State B is to he used at some future time against State A and is
therefore prejudicial, though remotely so, to the "peace, good order
or security" of State A. This being the case, it is difficult to see how
State A can lawfully forbid the passage of all ships through her
territorial sea carrying military cargo bound for State B.
D. EVENT IV (Coastal state's jurisdiction in territorial sea over
foreign fishing vessel.)

A number of questions are involved in Event IV. First, did the
fishing vessel, The Pelican, violate its right of innocent passage in
State .A's territorial sea by (a) traversing the territorial sea approximately one mile landward of the customary sea lane, (b) proceeding slowly, (c) with fishing nets on board but not secured in
accordance with the regulations of State A, and (d) taking handline
soundings and sea bed samples~
It appears that The Pelican was conforming to the provisions of
the Convention in accordance with the definition as provided in
Article 14 (2) in that she was navigating through the territorial sea
for the purpose of traversing that sea without entering internal
waters. Nothing in the convention, or in international law regarding
the right of innocent passage requires that the overseas ship follow
a particular sea lane within the territorial sea or be a certain distance
from the shore, absent specific regulations of the coastal state to insure safety o£ navigation, or for some other justifiable purpose. The
facts do not indicate the presence of any such regulations. Nor
does "passage" require that the ship travel at a minimum speed.
In fact, it may even stop and anchor if such is incidental to the
passage.
Therefore 5 the real question is whether the passage of The Pelican
was "innocent," in view of (a) the fact that the fishing nets, although
on board, vvere not secured in accordance \vith the regulations of
State· A and/or (b) the :fact that crew /members \Vere taking
soundings.
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The Convention contains a specific provision relating to the
"innocence" of foreign fishing vessels, as follows :
"Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered
innocent if they do not observe such laws and regulations as
the coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea." 35 (emphasis
added.)
Two things should- be noted about this provision. · First, it \vas
added at the Conference partly at the urging of Yugoslavia 36 and
the United Kingdom, 37 both of whom introduced proposals for an
amendment to the International La\v Commission's draft articles.
The Yugoslav delegate pointed out that fishing vessels presented a
special proble1n in relation to the right of innocent passage because
some were equipped with very modern gear that could be lowered
and taken up rapidly, so that it might be difficult to prevent their
fishing in the territorial sea of another State while ostensibly
traversing it for navigational purposes only. 3·8
Secondly, it should be noted that Article 14 (5) of the Convention
establishes a special requirement for "innocence" of fishing vessels
and in doing so it creates confusion regarding the provision immediately preceding in Article 14 ( 4) which says that "passage is innocent
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State." If fishing by a foreign vessel in the territorial
sea is considered to be prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal state then the special requirement regarding the
"innocence" of fishing vessels is redundant. (It would certainly seem
that fishing by a foreign vessel in the territorial sea of a coastal State,
\vhich is a violation of sovereignty, is definitely prejudicial to the
"good order" of the coastal State.) On the other hand, if fishing by
a foreign vessel by some semantic choreography is not considered to
be prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal
state, then it would have been less confusing if the basic definition of
"innocence" had been broadened to include "economic well-being"
along with "peace, good order or security."
Despite this confusion in and inadequacy of draftsmanship the important fact for our purpose is to note that the reason for the special
provision in the Convention regarding passage of fishing vessels
through the territorial sea was to prevent them from fishing, since
the coastal state has the universally-recognized exclusive right to fish
in those waters.
35
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The question then is to decide ·whether The Pelican volated its right
of innocent passage just because she did not conform to the exact
regulations promulgated by State A, even though its nets \Vere on
board and hence not in a position to fish. This is a hard question.
On the one hand the coastal state has the right under the Convention,
and apart therefrom, to insure that foreign vessels do not fish in its
territorial sea. Reasonable regulations of a coastal state requiring
the securing of fishing equipment are a means for accomplishing that
end. Hence, if the regulations are reasonable a material violation
thereof would constitute a breach of innocent passage.
On the other hand, if the foreign vessel in fact has her nets out of
the water, with her holds full of fish and no indication of intention to
fish, should it be considered a violation of innocent passage 1nerely
because of what might be a ''technical" violation of a precise regulation of the coastal state regarding the securing of fishing gear?
It would appear somewhat more just to conclude that The Pelican
\Vas not violating the right of innocent passage. She had Inade an
effort to secure her fishing nets even though not conforming exactly
to the regulations prescribed by State A to prevent fishing in the
territorial sea. This conclusion appears more valid than holding that
The Pelican violated the rule of "innocent passage," notwithstanding
some justifiable suspicions on the part of State A resulting from the
actions of The Pelican in traversing the territorial sea one mile landward of the customary sea lane and cruising slowly late in the
afternoon.
The next question is whether the taking of hand-line soundings \vas
a violation of "innocent passage." It is submitted that it \Vas not
because the taking of soundings either in the manner indicated here
or by some other mechanical or electronic device is a normal incident
to navigation. Thus, the fishing vessel \vas within its rights in taking
the soundings, notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances surrounding the action.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to conclude that The Pelican
was violating ''innocent passage" in having her cre\v take sea bed
samples since this action is not a normal incident to navigation.
Moreover, under the circumstances in the case; the sea bed samples \vere
probably being taken :for the purpose of mapping the submarine terrain or some other ulterior purpose unconnected with mere passage.
Of course, it might be argued that the sea bed samples were being
taken for purposes of "fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
research carried out \vith the intention of open publication," in accordance with Article 5 (1) of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. The t\vo rather obvious counter arguments are (a) that the
above Article applies only to such research outside of the territorial
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sea, and (b) that it is somewhat unlikely that such research vvould
be conducted by the crew o:f a fishing vessel.
Therefore, State A vvas justified in escorting The Pelican outside
the six-mile limit.
The next question is whether State A had the right under the
Convention to visit and search The Pelican in order to determine
vvhether there was a breach of the rules of innocent passage.
As a general rule during peacetime the vessels o:f one country
1nay not be visited and searched by the warships o£ another country
on the high seas. In the territorial sea such visit and search may
occur only if there exists "probable cause" for suspicion. During
vvar the rule is contrary as to the high seas; the belligerent is entitled
to visit and search all n1erchant ships, "the right growing out of,
and ancillary to, the greater right of capture." 39
I-Iowever, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone contains an express provision that "the coastal State may take
the nece8sary 8teps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is
not innocent." 40 'fhe question then narrows down to whether the
action of State A vvas a "necessary step'' to prevent what she suspected
was not "innocent" passage.
The facts do not indicate whether State A's warships first com1nunicated to The Pelican, prior to the boarding, in an attempt to
ascertain vvhy the fishing vessel was taking soundings and otherwise
doing things which gave rise to suspicions regarding the innocence
of her passage. Normally, the action of boarding :for a visit and
search vvould be justified only after the vessel refused to answer
questions as to her actions vvhich appeared to be violative of innocent
passage.
Here again we find that the coastal state must reach a proper
balance between its right to take necessary steps in its territorial sea
to prevent passage which is not innocent and its duty not to hamper
innocent passage through the territorial sea.
In the present instance, since The Pelican was delayed by State
A's warship for only thirty minutes, during which time she
would have traversed only two additional miles at her slow cruising
speed at the time, it may be concluded that the visit by the warship
did not ha1nper The Pelican's innocent passage, assu1ning :for the
moment that it was innocent. l-Ienee, even though the boarding of
The Pelican normally should not have been made until she had re39

The Nereide, 9 Granch. 338, 427 (1815) ; The II! aria 1 0 . Rob. 340, 360,
(1799) ; 3 Hyde, International Law 1!)58-1964 (2nd ed., 1945) ; 7 Flackworth,
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fused to answer satisfactorily questions as to her actions, State A's
action in making the visit n1ay be justified as a "necessary step" to
prevent passage through her territorial sea which, we concluded
earlier with respect to the taking of sea bed samples, was not innocent.
As to the search by the officers of State A's warship, this action
''a ppears to have been unjustified under the facts of the case. It "\vas
hardly necessary to search The Pelican in order to find out why the
soundings and sea bed samplings were being taken and why the vessel
"\vas cruising more slowly than normal one-mile landward of the customary sea lane. This information probably could have been secured
by asking questions during the visit unless officers of The Pelican refused to answer, or gave what appeared to be false or evasive answers.
Of course, it is possible that a search might have been required to
detern1ine whether the fishing gear had been secured as required by
State A's regulations, and whether the suspicions that The Pelican was
planning to fish in State A's territorial sea after dark were justified.
However, even here it would appear that proper interrogation during
the visit would have sufficed, "\vithout a physical search of the vessel.
This is not to say that a boarding party is lin1ited to a visit and may
never search. On the contrary, a search would be justified and lawful "\Vhen ever the boarding party has not received satisfactory answers
to its questions or, despite the answers, it honestly believes that a
search is a "necessary step" to determine whether the vessel is in fact
violating the right of innocent passage.
Under the facts presented here it may be concluded that the search
of The Pelican was not justified under internationalla w or under the
Convention as a "necessary step" to prevent a violation of innocent
passage.
EVENT IV (Jurisdiction of Coastal State over a criminal, citizen
of coastal state, aboard foreign vessel).

The final question is whether State A had any right to exercise
criminal jurisdiction on board The Pelican in arresting Mr. K., a
citizen o£ State A, who had committed prior crimes.
Here the language of the Convention indicates emphatically that
State A was without jurisdiction, even though Mr. K. was a citizen
of State A.
"The coastal State may not take any steps on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any
crime committed be fore the ship entered the territorial sea,
if the ship, proceeding from a foreign por~t, is only passing
607631-61,-----11
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through the territorial sea without entering internal
waters." 41 (emphasis added)
Since the crimes of Mr. K. had been committed before the ship
entered the territorial sea, the officers of the warship were not entitled
to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board The Pelican.
Moreover, in order to indicate generally the strict limitations under
the Convention of the coastal state's right to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea
it should be noted that even if Mr. J(. had committed a crime on board
the ship during its passage, criminal jurisdiction could not be exercised
except in the following cases :
" (a) I£ the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal
State; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea; or
(c) If the assistance o:f the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the ship or by the consul of the
country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic
in narcotic drugs." 42
It may be concluded that State A violated the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in arresting Mr. IC. on board The
Pelican and removing him. It matters not that the presence of Mr.
K. on board the fishing vessel was accidentally discovered. State A's
exercise of criminal jurisdiction would have been equally in violation
of the Convention even though it had been known that Mr. K. was
aboard The Pelican.

E. GENERAL CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT
OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL
SEA
It is often difficult to strike an equitable and just balance between
the coastal state's right to prevent passage through its territorial sea
which is not innocent and the con1.peting right of overseas states to
enjoy the right of innocent passage, both for their merchant vessels
and their warships. In the troubled, insecure world in which we now
live interpretations of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone by writers, and by judicial and other decision-makers
in case of disputes, such as the hypothetical situations given above,
will probably tend to favor the coastal state's regulations and actions
if they appear at all reasonable as a security measure.
41

42

Art.19(5).
Art. 19 (1).
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While one may understand the present tendency to weight the scales
slightly in favor of the coastal state in this matter of the right of
innocent passage, one may hope, without predicting that in time tensions among competing claimants in the world arena will have eased
to the extent that all disputes will be settled at the negotiation table,
in an arbitral tribunal, or in the International Court of Justice. In
such a period of relaxed world tension the "necessary steps" which
the coastal state would have to take in order to prevent passage which
is not innocent but instead is prejudicial to its "peace, good order or
security" would be minimal and the scales could then be weighted in
favor of the overseas state's right to enjoy innocent passage free from
numerous protective regulations and actions by the coastal state which
in varying degrees are bound to hamper passage through the territorial sea.
Stated another way, given world conditions in which passage
through the territorial sea both for merchant vessels and warships is
more likely. to be "innocent" than is the case today, the coastal state
will have far less need to take as many, or as severe, "necessary steps"
to prevent non-innocent passage, even though the right of the coastal
state to take those steps must always be recognized and guaranteed
either under a Convention or under the inherent right of self-rlefense.
That the articles of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone tend to favor the coastal state in regard to the "right
of innocent passage" can be documented. It is hoped that the ana1ysis
of the problem situations has served as a partial documentation.
Similarly, as discussed elsewhere, the record of the entire Conference,
including the other three Geneva Conventions of 1958, indicates a
rather decided tendency to favor the coastal state on many other
matterS. 43
This tendency is understandable in view of a variety of motivating
forces in the world, some of them inimical to the free world, but, by
and large, it is an unfortunate trend because in the long run the maximum utilization of the world's greatest common resource-the seascan be achieved only by what has been wisely and succinctly sum43

Note, for example (a) the strong sentiment toward increasing the breadth
of the territorial sea to six miles, (b) the vote of the First Committee in favor
of a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone even though this proposal failed in plenary
meetings, (c) the recognition of the special interests of the coastal state in the·
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, (d) the exclusive rights accorded the coastal state to explore and exploit
continental shelf resources and (e) the increase in the closing line for bays from
the widely accepted ten miles, at least prior to the dictum in the AngloNorwegian Fisheries Oase (see footnote 1), to fifteen miles in the I.L.C. draft
articles, to twenty-four miles in the Convention on the Territorial Sea (Art.
7 ( 4)).
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marized as an "explicit vveighting of the balance of decision in favor
of inclusive rather than exclusive uses." 44
Every time the coastal state is accorded, or attempts to usurp, the
right to push seaward "a new extension of state competence," 45 there
must be of necessity a corresponding diminution in the vigorous,
productive principle of freedom of the high seas which has served for
three centuries to keep the channels of navigation, communication,
and commerce open to all users in a shrinking world whose increasingly interdependent states can survive and prosper· only when such
channels are open.
Whether one is concerned with the application of the right of
innocent passage to a problem situation, or with some other article
of one of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, it is well to scrutinize
carefully every regulation promulgated and every action taken by
the coastal state to see that the overriding princi pie of freedom of
the seas suffers the least possible infringement commensurate ·with
the justifiable need of the coastal state to protect itself. As vvith
human liberty, the price of freedom of the seas is eternal vigilance,
particularly vigilance against duly constituted authority.
44

McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea : Community Perspectives versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539,588 (1958).
45
Garcia Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of The Resources of
the Sea, 13 et. seq. (1959). I have borrowed his' apt expression, "new extensions
of state competence" but not his conclusions which are generally contrary to
mine. Note, for example, his attempt to justify the Santiago Declaration of
Chile, Ecuador and Peru claiming "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" over
a 200-mile belt of high seas adjacent to their coasts. (Ibid., at 76.)

